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	Here are some considerations relevant to the idea of
proposing an energy position paper to Reagan which would emphasize
that the solution to the energy problem is to produce energy.

	Reagan has already taken the position that production is the
basic solution to the energy problem.  However, it has not been a
major emphasis of his campaign.  Because it is more of an issue between
Republicans and the Carter Administration, it will be more appropriate
after the nominating conventions.

	The use of this issue would be enhanced by a statement from
a large group of scientists and engineers that energy independence
through production is feasible.  The state of opinion among scientists
and engineers as a whole has probably worsened since 1973, because
the opposite view has been subsidized by government grants.
Nevertheless an impressive group of signatures could be obtained,
and the issue is salient enough so that many who usually support
the Democrats might join it.

	However, there are disadvantages to an overly partisan
approach.  Carter might win, and even if Reagan wins, he will
probably have to live with a Congress controlled by the Democrats.
Therefore, the pro-energy campaign should avoid making unnecessary
enemies.

	On the other hand, it is by no means certain that a
Republican administration would take resolute measures to
increase energy production.  While Nixon's initial reaction
to the 1973 energy crisis was correct, he didn't follow through,
and his appointees, e.g. Sawhill and Train, sabotaged Project
Independence.  Therefore, we must get to Reagan and his
advisers early and often.

	A key Government activity is a large R and D program
with parallel approaches to important problems.  It seems to
me that encouraging parallel approaches will provide conservative
economic justification for Government participation.

	We should advocate building an advanced breeder reactor,
but its advocacy should not begin by trying to kill Clinch River.
If a new reactor project gets well started, it may turn out
that Clinch River will become pointless, but starting by trying
to kill it will raise justified fears that the new project will
serve only that function.

	While the CONAES study was good on the whole and produced a report
we can live with, it seems to have been an implicit political compromise.
Specifically, oil shale seems to have been rejected so that environmental
sentiment would go along with the pronuclear general statements.

	Miro tells me that SE2 will testify before both platform
committees.  This is good but while SE2 has to be non-political,
individuals can do more.  A Reagan administration with a strong
commitment to energy production and the people to implement such
a policy (which Nixon didn't have) might actually solve the problem.

	We will be criticized for not equally emphasizing conservation.
I think we should stand up to this criticism rather than
make advance concessions to it.  The Government and industry are
already pursuing all most rational and some irrational means of
conservation, and much management efforts going into conservation
are distracting attention from objectives like product innovation
which are even more important for the world position of American
industry.
The big problem is the stagnation in production of new forms of
energy.

	The attached memo is a preliminary draft of a statement.

John McCarthy